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The United States is indisputably undergoing a ￿nancial crisis and is perhaps headed for a deep
recession. Here we examine three claims about the way the ￿nancial crisis is a⁄ecting the economy
as a whole and argue that all three claims are myths. We also present three underappreciated
facts about how the ￿nancial system intermediates funds between households and corporate busi-
nesses.Conventional analyses of the ￿nancial crisis focus on interest rate spreads. We argue that
such analyses may lead to mistaken inferences about the real costs of borrowing and argue that, dur-
ing ￿nancial crises, variations in the levels of nominal interest rates might lead to better inferences
about variations in the real costs of borrowing. Moreover, we argue that even if current increase
in spreads indicate increases in the riskiness of the underlying projects, by itself, this increase does
not necessarily indicate the need for massive government intervention. We call for policymakers to
articulate the precise nature of the market failure they see, to present hard evidence that di⁄erenti-
ates their view of the data from other views which would not require such intervention, and to share
with the public the logic and evidence that burnishes the case that the particular intervention they
are advocating will ￿x this market failure.
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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Clearly, the United States and the world economy are undergoing a major ￿nancial
crisis. Here we examine several pieces of evidence on the nature of the ￿nancial crisis and
the mechanisms by which the ￿nancial crisis is thought to a⁄ect the non￿nancial sector of
the economy.
That the United States is undergoing a ￿nancial crisis cannot be disputed. Evidence
of the ￿nancial crisis consists of the following: First, several major ￿nancial institutions have
failed. Second, various stock markets have fallen dramatically, especially in the week after
the bailout plan was passed. Third, spreads on a variety of di⁄erent types of loans over
comparable U.S. Treasury securities have widened dramatically.
Here we examine four claims about the way the ￿nancial crisis is a⁄ecting the economy
as a whole and argue that all four claims are myths. Conventional analyses of the ￿nancial
crisis focus on interest rate spreads. We argue that such analyses may lead to mistaken
inferences about the real costs of borrowing and argue that, during ￿nancial crises, variations
in the levels of nominal interest rates might lead to better inferences about variations in the
real costs of borrowing.
1. Three Myths about Quantities
The ￿nancial crisis has also been associated with three widely held claims about the
nature of the crisis and the associated spillovers to the rest of the economy. The ￿nancial
press and policymakers have made the following three claims about the nature of the crisis.
1. Bank lending to non￿nancial corporations and individuals has declined sharply.
2. Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent.
3. Commercial paper issuance by non￿nancial corporations has declined sharply, andrates have risen to unprecedented levels.
Here we examine these claims using data fromthe Federal Reserve Board and Bloomberg.
Our argument that all three claims are false is based on data up until October 15, 2008.1
Figure 1A displays weekly data on the total amount of bank credit for all U.S. com-
mercial banks from 2001 onward. Figure 1B displays the same data from the beginning of
2008 onward. Bank credit consists of the aggregate amount of assets held by these banks
excluding vault cash. As is clear from these ￿gures, bank credit has not declined during the
￿nancial crisis. Indeed, bank credit appears to have risen relative to trend in the month of
September. Figures 2A and 2B display analogous data for loans and leases made by U.S.
commercial banks. Again, we see no evidence of any decline during the ￿nancial crisis. Fig-
ures 3A and 3B display data for commercial and industrial loans. Again, we see no evidence
that the ￿nancial crisis has a⁄ected lending to non￿nancial businesses. Figures 4A and 4B
display data for consumer loans and show no evidence that the ￿nancial crisis has a⁄ected
consumer lending.
These ￿gures show that the ￿rst claim, that banks have essentially stopped lending to
nonbank entities and individuals, is false, at least in the aggregate as of October 15.
Figures 5A and 5B display data for interbank loans made by all U.S. commercial banks.
These ￿gures show that, at least in the aggregate, interbank lending is healthy. The second
claim, that the volume of interbank lending has fallen sharply, is false, at least as of October
15.
Figures 6A and 6B display data for the stock of commercial paper outstanding for
￿nancial and non￿nancial corporations. These ￿gures show that, while commercial paper
1We use the data available on October 25, 2008. For more details see Troshkin (2008).
2issued by ￿nancial institutions has declined, commercial paper issued by non￿nancial insti-
tutions is essentially unchanged during the ￿nancial crisis.
Figures 7A and 7B display data for the interest rate on commercial paper with a
maturity of 90 days for ￿nancial and non￿nancial corporations2. These ￿gures show that,
during the ￿nancial crisis, this interest rate has risen for ￿nancial institutions and has barely
budged for non￿nancial institutions with a AA rating. It has risen fairly dramatically for
non￿nancial corporations with an A2/P2 rating. Note that, even though the interest rate
for ￿nancial institutions has risen recently, it is still well below the levels that prevailed from
the beginning of 2006 to the middle of 2007. These ￿gures show that the ￿nancial crisis has
not led commercial paper rates to rise to levels well beyond historical levels. Taken together,
Figures 6A through 7B show that the third claim is false, at least as of October 15.
We have documented that commercial and industrial loans made by banks have risen
dramatically during the period of the ￿nancial crisis. One story we have heard is the fol-
lowing. The rise in loans is in large part due to non￿nancial ￿rms drawing on their loan
commitments and lines of credit and loans to non￿nancial ￿rms without such commitments
have declined. Furthermore, this decline in loans to non￿nancial ￿rms without commitments
signals a dramatic future decline in bank lending. Data that support this story, especially
data that support the signaling view, would be extremely useful. We have seen no data from
the current crisis that support this story, especially the signaling view component of it.
2Some of these data are not available. In particular, the A2/P2 Non￿nancial rates are missing for the
week of October 8, 2008.
32. Three Underappreciated Facts
We now documents three facts about the way the ￿nancial system intermediates funds
between households and corporate businesses.
1. In the aggregate non￿nancial corporations can pay their capital expenditures en-
tirely from their retained earnings and dividends without borrowing from banks or households.
2. In the aggregate, increases in non￿nancial corporate debt are roughly matched by
increases in their share repurchases.
3. Only about 20% of non￿nancial corporate debt is held by banks.
These three facts suggest that the typical ￿rm can ￿nance its capital expenditures
entirely from retained earnings. It is di¢ cult to see how disruptions in ￿nancial markets
will directly a⁄ect investment decisions by a typical ￿rm. Furthermore, to the extent that
redirecting funds from ￿rms that have excess resources to ￿rms that need resources is impor-
tant, such redirection can occur if ￿rms are able to borrow and lend to each other directly
or pursue joint ventures of various kinds. The data displayed here is from the Flow of Funds
of the Federal Reserve Board. (The data underlying Figures 8A, 8B, 9A, and 9B are from
Table F.102)
Figure 8A and 8B display the sum of retained earnings and dividends of nonfarm,
non￿nancial corporate business (line 9 and 3) and capital expenditures by these ￿rms (line
11). These ￿gures show that, in the aggregate, without any funds from the rest of the
economy, the cash available to these ￿rms from their operations can easily pay for their
investment expenditures.
Figures 9A and 9B display new equity less share repurchases (line 39) and funds raised
4through debt instruments (line 40). These ￿gures show that new equity issues are roughly
matched by funds raised through credit market instruments. The data suggest that in the
aggregate ￿rms raise debt to buy back their shares, and not to ￿nance investment. (Note
here that we are not attributing causality and that we are well aware that this pattern does
not hold ￿rm by ￿rm.)
In terms of the role of banks in ￿nancing debt issued by non￿nancial corporate busi-
nesses, we note that, banks lend directly to such businesses and indirectly by holding publicly
traded bonds to these businesses. In the second quarter of 2008, we estimate that such bank
lending is approximately $1 trillion. Non￿nancial corporate businesses obtain funds from
banks and by issuing publicly traded bonds that are held by nonbank ￿nancial institutions
such as life insurance companies as well as directly by households. The total amount of such
funds is approximately $4.4 trillion. Thus, roughly 80 percent of such business borrowing
is done outside of the banking system. The claim that disruptions to the banking system
necessarily destroy the ability of non￿nancial businesses to borrow from households is highly
questionable.
3. Spreads
Conventional analyses of interest rate data focus heavily on the spreads between in-
terest rates on various types of loans and interest rates on Treasury securities with similar
maturities and pay much less attention to the levels of interest rates on various types of loans.
Here we discuss two issues concerning common interpretations of these spreads
5A. Spreads versus Levels
One rationale for the focus on spreads is that the relevant interest rate that matters
for economic decisions is the real rate, that is, the nominal rate less expected in￿ ation. If one
believes that the real rate on Treasury securities does not ￿ uctuate very much, then variations
in the spread are a good measure of variations in the real interest rate on various types of
loans.
While this rationale may be compelling in normal times, we think that a focus on
spreads can lead to misleading inferences during ￿nancial crises. Financial crises are often
accompanied by a ￿ ight to quality during which the real return to Treasury securities falls
dramatically, that is, the nominal return falls dramatically for reasons other than changes
in expected in￿ ation. If these arguments are correct, then a researcher who infers that the
increase in spreads re￿ ects an increase in the real cost of borrowing would be making an
incorrect inference. The increase in the spread is due to the drop in the real return to
Treasury securities as a result of the ￿ ight to quality and does not constitute an increase in
the real cost of borrowing.
Macroeconomic research suggests that in￿ ation rates are not highly variable in the
short run, so that the recent experience of in￿ ation is a good predictor of in￿ ation in the near
future. If this research is correct, then during ￿nancial crises variations in the level of the
nominal rate on borrowing is a good measure of the variation of the real rate of borrowing.
In Figures 10A through 14B we plot the analogs of earlier ￿gures for a variety of types
of interest rate data. These ￿gures show that while spreads have certainly widened, the
level of interest rates of various types of borrowing are well below levels in recent non-crisis
years. For example, Figures 10A and 10B display the interest rate on BBB rated corporate
6bonds and that on Treasury bills with similar maturities. While the levels have recently risen
modestly, they are well below the levels in, say, 2006.
B. Do increased spreads re￿ ect increased risks or increased costs of intermedia-
tion?
In nearly every recession projects become riskier and the spread between a riskless rate
on securities, such as Treasury bills, and the rate on securities used to ￿nance risky projects,
such as the BBB corporate bonds, widens. Such an increase in spreads, by itself, however,
does not justify massive government intervention. Indeed, many economic theories implies
that such massive intervention will likely do more harm than good.
Since the proponents of the e⁄ectively one trillion dollar bailout have not laid out
the details of the logic by which they think the current situation necessitates such a bailout
we can only discuss what economic theory implies. One view of the current situation that
might justify intervention is that projects that are well understood not to be risky cannot get
funding not because banks are nervous about the returns on the project but rather because
the weak balance sheets of the bank force them to pass on what otherwise would be very
pro￿table loans. If this is the view that underlies the rationale for the massive government
intervention then we feel it is incumbent on policy-makes to provide hard evidence that good
borrowers with relatively safe projects are unable to get credit because of the increased cost
of intermediation due to a breakdown in the system of ￿nancial intermediation, not because
of increases in the riskiness of their project.
One might guess that documenting this view will be an uphill battle because many
versions of this view would imply large pro￿t opportunities for the subset of banks with
relatively healthy balance sheets, so that part of the documentation will need to explain
7why the relatively healthy banks are unable to take advantage of what, by the logic of the
argument, are pro￿table opportunities.
4. Response to Critics
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) present data on the volume of new syndicated loans
made to large companies. These are loans originated by banks and sold by the originator to
a syndicate of banks and other ￿nancial institutions, including insurance companies, pension
funds, mutual funds and so on. The amount of these new loans has fallen fairly dramatically,
from a peak of approximately $659 billion in the middle of 2007 to about $175 billion in the
August to October 2008 period.
Ivashina and Scharfstein recognize that the decline in this form of lending must be
reconciled with the evidence that the aggregate amount of loans outstanding by the domestic
o¢ ces of U.S. commercial banks has increased over this period.
Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, their data on syndicated loans consists
of loans held by ￿nancial institutions other than the domestic o¢ ces of U.S. commercial
banks. It is possible that these other ￿nancial institutions are holding less debt. Second, it is
possible that ￿rms are repaying their debts rapidly. This possibility implies that a signi￿cant
fraction of ￿rms are not constrained in the availability of funds to make investments in
plant, equipment and structures. Third, it is possible that ￿rms which had preexisting loan
commitments with banks are drawing down on these commitments. We have seen no decisive
evidence that because ￿rms are drawing down on these commitments, banks are not lending
to otherwise pro￿table ￿rms.
Ivashina and Scharfstein do present evidence that some ￿rms which are drawing on
8these commitments have below investment grade credit ratings. This evidence is for a very
small sample of ￿rms. These ￿rms have drawn down $13 billion of their loan commitments.
Clearly this drawdown cannot account for more than a small fraction of the compositional
changes. Even if one granted that there has been a big increase in the use of loan commit-
ments, it is di¢ cult to see why that increase is evidence of a massive market failure. Indeed,
this evidence may re￿ ect a well-functioning market. To see why, note that one interpretation
of such commitments is that they represent an insurance contract between banks and ￿rms
which allows ￿rms to draw upon these commitments when they need to. By de￿nition, an
insurance contract pays o⁄when the insured party su⁄ers a loss. The insurer may well prefer
not to pay o⁄ on its contract and use these funds elsewhere, but the terms of the contract
require it to do so.
Although they are not clear on the matter, these authors may be implicitly arguing
that the increased drawdown of loan commitments signals that when these commitments
expire total credit will fall. But that is exactly what economic theory would predict happens
in a generic recession, even a deep generic recession: when the recession fully hits, fewer good
projects will exist and lending will fall. Clearly, that by itself does not justify a massive
government intervention.
Let us be perfectly clear: We are not arguing that it is impossible to use economic
theory and hard evidence to clearly identify a market failure that necessitates such a massive
government intervention. Rather, we are arguing that it is incumbent on the proponents of
such an intervention to set their alarms a little earlier, sharpen their pencils a bit more, and
do the hard work needed to make that case.
A recent paper by Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, Fillat, and Montoriol-Garriga at the
9Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (hereafter referred to as the BF paper) comments on an
earlier version of this paper3. The authors of the BF paper begin by claiming that the three
claims we document as myths are indeed facts. Puzzlingly, they then go on to agree that the
claims are, indeed myths. Instead they want to argue that if we look at disaggregated data
the ￿nancial crisis is very serious. Unfortunately, they bring very little disaggregated data to
the discussion and mostly conduct an exercise in speculation.
They show that issuance of asset backed securities has declined. Such securities are
issued by a wide variety of ￿nancial institutions and are often backed by mortgages. A decline
in the issuance of such securities does not by itself indicate or suggest that new lending by
banks has declined and the BF study o⁄ers no data to support that view. They o⁄er data on
loan commitments used up to the second quarter of 2008, long before the bailout plan was
proposed and passed.
The BF paper agrees that interbank lending has not dried up and goes on to assert,
based on no evidence, that loans to primary broker-dealers has declined. They show that
cash held by banks has increased. It is not clear from their discussion what this rise has to
do with interbank lending.
In terms of the commercial paper market, they show that the volume of issuance of
A2/P2 paper has declined but do not point out that the volume as of October 2008 exceeds
that in 2006. They also focus on spreads rather than estimates of the real rates directly. As
we have argued, a focus on spreads may well be misplaced in times of ￿ ight to quality. We
have also argued that even if spreads increased because risks have increased that by itself
3We found the comments by Robert Eisenbeis, Ron Feldman, and Richard Todd very useful in helping us
frame our reponse to the BF paper.
10does not show justify massive government intervention.
5. Conclusion
Our analysis has raised questions about the claims made for the mechanism whereby
the ￿nancial crisis is a⁄ecting the overall economy. We emphasize that we do not dispute
that the United States is undergoing a ￿nancial crisis and that the United States economy
may currently be in a recession or may experience one in the near future, perhaps even a very
deep one. We do not dispute that spreads between safe securities and risky securities have
increased.
Our main point is that policymakers have not done the hard work of convincing the
public￿ or even academic economists￿of the precise nature of the market failure they see,
of presenting hard evidence, not speculation, that di⁄erentiates their view of the data from
other views, and the logic by which the particular intervention they are advocating will ￿x
this market failure4. We feel that a trillion dollar intervention warrants a bit more serious
analysis than we have seen.
Our analysis is based on publicly available data. Policymakers have access to other
sources of data as well. Policymakers could well believe that bold action is necessary based
on data that are di⁄erent from that considered here. If so, responsible policymaking requires
that they share both the data and the analysis that underlies the need for bold policy with
the public.
4See, for example, the lecture by Anil Kashyap at http://igmchicago.org/, who argues there are worrisome
parallels between the current policies being contemplated in the current ￿nancial crisis in the United States
and the policies pursued in Japan during its prolonged crisis.
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